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Abstract
On May 8, 1963, the South Vietnamese Civil Guard killed eight Buddhists who had
protested the ban on flying the Buddhist flag. Events such as this ignited a political
confrontation between the Buddhists and the South Vietnamese government. Although
practicing Buddhists did not make up a majOlity of the population, they effectively
enflamed the Vietnamese people against Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South
Vietnam, and captured the attention of the American news media by staging sacrificial
suicides, hunger strikes, and street protests. The United States tried to convince Diem to
make some concessions to the Buddhists, but their powers of persuasion proved
ineffective. Without seriously considering an altemative to the Diem govemment, the
administration ultimately backed a coup led by Diem's disgruntled generals. However,
the coup did not provide the stability that the administration sought. Instead, the postcoup govemment became more dysfunctional than its predecessor and would only
survive for two and a half months. The military coup of2 November 1963 that
overthrew the Diem government in South Vietnam would not have happened the way it
did if the American administration had not over-reacted to the Buddhist crisis, and the
nation would not have experienced a messy aftennath had the White House planned for a
post-Diem South Vietnam.
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Creating a Crisis: The Diem Coup as an American Construction
On May 8, 1963, the South Vietnamese Civil Guard killed eight Buddhists who
had protested the ban on flying the Buddhist flag. l Events such as this ignited a political
confrontation between the Buddhists and the South Vietnamese government. Although
practicing Buddhists did not make up a majority ofthe population, they effectively
enflamed the Vietnamese people against Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of Vietnam, and
captured the attention of the American news media by sacrificial suicides, hunger strikes
and street protests. At first, the United States tried to convince Diem to make some
concessions to the Buddhists, but their powers of persuasion proved ineffective? As the
Buddhist crises deepened and the majority of the Vietnamese population turned against
Diem, President John F. Kennedy recognized the instability ofthe situation and the
failure of previous policies. The Kennedy administration feared that the lack of popular
support for the regime would affect America's ability to defeat the communists. The
months and years of muddling through Vietnam policy, subtly influencing military
matters and not so subtly giving millions in economic aid, had failed. The
administration could choose to abandon Vietnam, escalate, or continue to wait. They
decided to escalate.
Without seriously considering an alternative to the Diem government, the
administration backed a coup led by Diem's disgruntled generals. However, the coup did
not provide the stability that the administration sought. Instead, the post-coup
government became more dysfunctional than its predecessor, and would only survive for
two and a half months. The military coup of2 November 1963 that ovelihrew the Diem
1 David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 213.
2 Ibid., 214.
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government in Vietnam would not have happened the way it did ifthe American
administration had not over-reacted to the Buddhist crisis, and the nation would not have
experienced a messy aftennath had the White House planned for a post-Diem Vietnam.
The United States played a central role in the plot to ovelihrow Diem. First, the
administration operated from the premise that failure in Vietnam would spill over into all
of Southeast Asia, which made U.S. officials willing to suppoli extreme action, even a
coup attempt. 3 Second, government officials decided that Ngo Dinh Nhu, the vice
president of Vietnam and Diem's brother, could no longer occupy a prominent position in
the Vietnamese government because his oppressive policies had alienated a large
percentage of the population. 4 The administration concluded that ifNhu remained in
power, then the communists would win the conflict In order to rid Vietnam ofNhu, the
administration evidenced a willingness to accept a coup against Diem. 5 Third, even
though the administration subtly pressured Diem to get rid of his brother, they did not
give Diem an ultimatum because they feared that he would uncover the plot, declare
maliiallaw, squash a coup attempt, and expel the United States from Vietnam. 6 The
failure to issue an ultimatum led to unceliainty within the South Vietnamese government.
Diem did not know if the United States was backing a coup or not. FOUlih, the Kennedy

3 Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
the President, January 9,1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume I, Vietnam,
1964, www.state.gov; (accessed February 12,2007).
4 Memorandum of Conversation, 'Vietnam,' August 26, 1963, JFKL: Roger Hisman Papers,
Country Series, box 4, folder: Vietnam: White House Meetings 8/26/63-8/29/63, State Memcons. The
National Security Archive, The George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, 5-6.
(accessed February 12,2007).
5 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 24, 1963, FRUS,
1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963,281, www.state.gov, (accessed February 12,
2007).
6 Memorandum of conference with the President, August 29, 1963, 1200, JFKL: JFKP: National
Security File: Meetings and Memoranda series, box 316, folder: Meetings on Vietnam, 8/24/63-8/31/63,
The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, 5-6,
(accessed February 12,2007).
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administration sent a cable to the American embassy that supported a coup. The 24
August 1963 cable contained orders for Ambassador Hem)' Cabot Lodge, in conjunction
with the Central Intelligence Agency, to begin to encourage disgruntled generals to
organize against Diem. 7 Fifth, the United States clearly cOlmnunicated to the coup
generals that it wouldfully support a new government if Diem's govermnent failed,s a
position which was a radical departure from earlier policy,9 and a significant move since
at the time the United States supplied forty percent of the South Vietnamese
govermnent's funding. 10 Sixth, the White House cut off critical financial and diplomatic
support for the Diem govermnent to prove their displeasure with the situation, a move
that critically weakened the Diem govermnent and emboldened coup leaders. I I Finally,
while debating what position the United States should take, the majority of administration
officials did not contest that ovelihrowing Diem would be the preferable option if the
coup succeeded. 12 Almost all oftheir analysis focused on the potential success of the
coup.

7 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 24, 1963, FRUS,
1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963. 281, www.state.gov, (accessed February 12,
2007).
8 Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 28, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
IV, Vietnam, January-August 1963, www.state.gov, 1. (accessed February 12,2007).
9 Memorandum for the Record of Discussion at the Daily White House Staff Meeting, November
4, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963. 288, www.state.gov, (accessed
February 12,2007). See also Kaiser, 216.
10 Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam, November 20, 1963, FRUS,
1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963. 321, www.state.gov, (accessed February 12,
2007).
11 Memorandum for the Record of Discussion at the Daily White House Staff Meeting, November
4, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963. 288, www.state.gov, (accessed
February 12,2007).
12 Draft Cable, Eyes Only for Ambassador Lodge [CIA cable 79407, noted in upper right hand
corner], October 30, 1963, JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box 201, folder: Vietnam,
General: State & Defense Cables, 10/29163-10/31/63. The National Security Archive, The George
Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (accessed February 12,2007).
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Officials within the White House finnly believed that the fall of Vietnam to the
communists would lead to the collapse of all of Southeast Asia, and cause America's
allies in Europe, Australia, Latin America, and Japan to lose confidence in American
resolve. Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam's neighbors, were experiencing political problems
of their own as their neutral governments continued to fight communist guenillas and
teetered on the brink of collapse. 13 The United States recently had negotiated a neutrality
agreement in Laos to keep it from falling to the communists; however, strategists in the
White House thought that the peace was fragile and that infiltration from a strong, united,
communist Vietnam would cause a rapid collapse. 14 A similar argument held for
Cambodia. These three countries symbolized more than three dominos that would topple
one after another; they would fall simultaneously with the potential to causes a swift
deterioration in America's position around the globe.
Once the United States began down the slippery slope of deserting allies, rebels
across the world would be emboldened and allies disheartened. In a memo to President
Johnson, Robert McNamara made the argument succinctly:
The consequences of a Communist-dominated South Vietnam are extremely
serious ... a truly "neutral" Southeast Asia is very unlikely to emerge from such a
sequence of events ... South Vietnam is both a test of U.S. finnness and
specifically a test of U.S. capacity to deal with "wars of national liberation." ...
there can be little doubt that any country threatened in the future by Communist
subversion would have reason to doubt whether we would really see the thing
through. This would apply even in such theoretically remote areas as Latin
Amelica .... Thus, the stakes in preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam are
so high that. .. we must go on bending every effort to win. 15

13 Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
the President, January 9,1964, 1964-1968, FRUS, Volume I Vietnam, 1964.8, www.state.gov, (accessed
February 12,2007).
14 Ibid.
IS Ibid.
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Clearly, saving Vietnam fi'om cOlmnunist conquest had vital strategic and psychological
benefits. Additionally, the United States could demonstrate its resolve in Vietnam and
prevent the spread of communism. Lee Kuan Yew, fonner Prime Minister of Singapore
(1959-1990) recently verified the validity ofthe administration's analysis by arguing that
American resolve in Vietnam directly contributed to the positive economic and political
development of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. In turn, these countries helped precipitate the current
economic refonns in communist China and Vietnam. 16 Given the magnitude ofthe
strategic costs of pulling out of Vietnam, advisors concluded that the United States
should take its stand there.
Besides the strategic military and international fallout oflosing Vietnam, officials
feared political consequences. Neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson wanted
to be the president who "lost Vietnam." The specter ofthe fall of China still haunted
politicians. The defeat ofthe nationalists in China politically devastated the Tmman
administration in the early 1950s, and future administrations took notice. For instance,
on 3 Febmary 1964, President Johnson told a journalist from the Miami Herald, about
Vietnam, " ... mn and let the dominoes start falling over. And God Almighty, what they
said about us leaving China would just be wanning up ... ,,17 Moreover, Fredrik
Logevall, in his Choosing War: the Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War
in Vietnam, argues that Johnson and his advisors worried that losing Vietnam would

16 Lee Kuan Yew, "The United States, Iraq, and the War on Terror," Foreign Affairs 86 (2007),
not paginated. Academic Search Premiere (accessed March 7,2007).
17 Robert MaIm, A Grand Delusion, America's Descent into Vietnam (New York: Basic Books,
2001),312.
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destroy their personal credibility and the integrity oftheir party.I8 To avoid personal
humiliation, they glossed over the reports of a failing counter-insurgency effort, preached
American responsibility to the free world, and worked feverishly to keep from proving
themselves wrong. 19
Robert Mann gives more credibility to the argument that American politicians
considered Vietnam a political powder keg. He argues that Democrats, afraid of
criticizing the leader of their own pmiy, allowed President Johnson to bully them into
silence. Johnson wrapped his policies in the American flag before presenting them to the
Senate. 20 If someone objected to one of his policies, Johnson turned on him quickly,
questioning the patriotism ofthe individual Senator, and his commitment to the troopS?I
For instance, in May, 1965 Johnson asked for more money for the troops in Vietnam. He
really did not need the money, but America just had responded to an uprising in a
Caribbean nation, and he wanted to associate the conflict in Vietnam with "manning the
ramparts in the nation's backyard." Mann argues that it was this SOli of shrewd political
maneuvering that made Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell quip, "going against
Johnson on an issue like this would be 'like going against motherhood.",22 Additionally,
Johnson succeeded in keeping Congress so quiet that Mann concludes, "[fJrom almost the
beginning of the war to its end, the story of Congress was one of a tragic abdication of
power and responsibility.,,23 Instead of using their constitutional ability to limit the
President's authority to wage war, they allowed the President to choose Vietnmn policies

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
20 Ibid.,
21 Ibid.,
22 Ibid.,
23 Ibid.,
18

19

387.
387-388.
728.
435.
43(.
730.
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that preserved his domestic agenda. 24 Neither Kelmedy nor Johnson wanted to lose an
election because they failed in Vietnam. Given the potential military and political fallout
of failing in South East Asia, the White House dismissed political solutions that could
have resulted in the neutralization of Vietnam and sought a change in govermnent.
By late August, 1963, largely owing to the escalation of incidents involving
Buddhist monks clashing with South Vietnamese forces, the administration sought an
adjustment in Diem's regime-a removal of Diem's brother Nhu from power. After the
South Vietnamese govermnent staged the pagoda raids in May, Buddhists began
protesting the oppressive Diem govennnent. Not only did Nhu and his wife express no
sympathy for the Buddhists' problems, they exacerbated the situation by making crude
connnents about the self-immolation ofthe Buddhists. For instance, in a letter to the
editor published in the New York Times, Madame Nhu stated:
I may shock some by saying 'I would beat such provocateurs ten times more if
they wore monk's robes,' and 'I would clap hands at seeing another monk
barbecue show, for one cannot be responsible for the madness of others.' But
what else is there to say when the world, under a mad spell about the so-called
'Buddhist affair' ... needs an electroshock to resume its senses?5
Such behavior effectively turned public sentiment against the Diem regime and against
the American govermnent. U.S. and world newspapers widely reported these comments,
and newspapennen began to question the wisdom of suppOliing the Nhus. The
administration did not think that Diem was the problemper se, but that his brother and
wife were acting immaturely?6 During a meeting with President Kennedy, General
Maxwell Taylor said that the danger existed that Nhu would consolidate his power and

Ibid., 731.
Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu. Julius Venner. (Rev.) Aloysius McCall, O.F.M. Cap. Churchill. .. New
York Times, August 14, 1963, Pro Quest Historical Newspapers, 32, (accessed March 5, 2007).
26 Kaiser, 228-230.
24
25
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completely subordinate all of the generals and the civilian gove11lment. The result would
be a collapse in morale of mid-level military forces who might decide to quit. Such an
event would prevent the successful conclusion of the conflict and would ensure that Diem
eventually would lose the war?7 Several times duling June and July, the administration
pressured Diem to apologize to the Buddhists and to rein in his brother and sister-in-law;
however, he failed to do so, and the White House began to question his ability to control

On 8 July 1963, Major General Tran Van Don ofthe South Vietnamese army
infonned a CIA officer that coup plans existed to ovelihrow Diem?9 FUlihennore, in
August, both General Le Van Kim and General Tan Van Don told Am eli can ambassadors
that Nhu had taken control of much of the gove11lment and that the population was losing
faith in the regime. 30 General Kim even claimed that Nhu controlled the Anny like a
puppet master. 31 General Don told a U.S. official that Diem used Nhu as a "thinker and
advisor. ,,32 RepOlis such as these confinned the administration's fears that Diem's
gove11lment teetered on the blink of collapse. Kennedy and his advisors still believed

27 Memorandum ofConversatiQn, "Vietnam," August 26,1963, Noon, Roger Hilsman Papers,
Country Series, box 4, folder: Vietnam: White House Meetings 8/26/63-8/29/63, State Memcons, The
National Security Archive, The George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/, (accessed
February 12,2007).
28 Ibid.
29 DCI BriefIng 9 July 1963, JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box 51, folder:
Cuba: Subjects, Intelligence Material, The National Security Archive, The George Washington University,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (accessed February 12,2007).
30 Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, August 24,
1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963. 275, www.state.gov, (accessed
February 12,2007).
31 Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, August 24, 1963, FRUS,
1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963. 274, www.state.gov, accessed February 12, 2007.
32Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, August 24,
1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963. 275, www.state.gov, (accessed
February 12,2007).

Creating a Crisis 12
that the Viet Cong had yet to exploit the Buddhist Crisis?3 However, they feared that
continued deterioration of the situation would hurt the war effort. Their fear led several
administration officials to draft a cable on 24 August that effectively backed the idea of a
coup against Diem.
On 24 August 1963, the White House, with the specific pennission of President
Kennedy, sent a cable to the embassy in Saigon that expressed a loss of faith in the Diem
regime and a desire for the embassy to explore alternate possibilities for leadership. The
cable represents the most significant push by the U.S. government for a coup in Vietnam.
Rodger Hilsman wrote the first draft ofthe cable, and Michael FOlTestal gave it to the
President. Robert McNamara, and several other officials who would later criticize the
cable were on vacation or unavailable on the weekend. However, this did not prevent the
acting advisors from clearing the cable and sending it. 34 The cable stated clearly that the
United States could not continue to support the Vietnamese government as long as Nhu
had any power. If Diem did not get rid of his brother, then the United States would get
rid of him. The cable told the embassy to continue to push Diem to refonn his
government, but the second order stated that Lodge should "tell appropriate military
commanders we will give them direct suppOli in any interim period of breakdown central
government mechanism." Furthernlore, the administration told the ambassador to
explore "alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring about
Diem's replacement ifthis should become necessary.,,35 Lodge acted immediately.36
Anyone of these policies would have been a significant departure fi'om the status quo,
Ibid.
Kaiser, 230-23l.
35 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 24, 1963, FRUS,
1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963, www.state.gov, (accessed February 12,2007).
36 Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987), 180-18l.
33

34
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but in aggregate they painted a picture of Amelica' s commitment to a regime change. Up
until this point, the administration had only received scattered, unreliable repOlis that
coup plotters existed. 37 Now, the govemment wanted the embassy to find disgruntled
officials, express the United States' displeasure with Diem, and promise them support in
the event that they precipitated a coup.
Despite their enthusiasm for a coup, the administration did not have evidence that
broad suppOli for an ovelihrow of Diem existed. David Kaiser argues that a developed
plot did not exist in Vietnam until the United States sent feelers out to the generals. He
argues that the administration believed that many coup plotters existed because of recent
articles in the newspapers by David Halberstam, but no evidence from the country
supported the idea that a coup was brewing. Instead, it was the United States that really
precipitated action. 38 Some of the reports that came out of Vietnam at the time support
Kaiser's argument. In the middle of July, intelligence analysts speculated that some of
the rumors of plots coming out of Vietnam could have been ones planted by the
administration as a ruse to root out disloyal commanders. 39 Even if some of the plotters
had been discontented and had contemplated a coup before the cable, they were not
organized in large numbers. This is lmown because even after Lodge made inquilies, the
generals took months to get the coup together.
The 24 August 1963 cable sparked a debate within the administration over
whether the Amelican govenunent should continue to support a coup or if it should try to
stop it. Fredlick Nolting and Secretary Robeli McNamara voiced the strongest
Ibid., 180-18I.
Kaiser, 243.
39 DCI Briefing 9 July 1963, JFKL: JFKP, National Security File: Country File, box 51, folder:
Cuba: Subjects, Intelligence Material, he National Security Archive, The George Washington University,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (accessed February 12, 2007).
37
38
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opposition during this time, while Under Secretary George Ball, W. Averell Harriman
and Rodger Hilsman all supported the coup. The administration knew that they were
backing a coup, and they needed to decide if they wanted to go all in or if they wanted to
back off. Nolting did not think that the generals could pull it off because they did not
have sufficient support. At the same time, he commented on the delicate situation. He
said that if America tumed its back on the generals, then they would completely abandon
any coup attempts, which would overly limit the U.S. options.40 In the same meeting
where Nolting voiced his concems, McNamara "expressed grave doubts that the generals
could carry out a clean coup ... military forces were few and scattered." 41 Despite the
misgivings of McNamara and Nolting, Ball advocated a coup because the United States
could no longer continue to support Nhu since he continued to gain power. He believed
that the administration was "beyond the point of no retum.,,42 Along with Ball,
Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins supported a COUp.43 McNamara, the president,
and most ofthe advisors thought that the United States should not support an ovetihrow
if it did not have a solid chance of success. 44 The president decided to communicate this
to Lodge. In an August 28 meeting with his staff he expressed this: " ... the President
wanted to be assured that there was full coordination between Saigon and Washington ...
he wanted to avoid any situation in which the field was going ahead on a plan that was
against their better judgment because they thought it was orders fi-om Washington ..

.',45

40 Memorandum of Conference With the President, August 27,1963 FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
IV, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 303, www.state.gov, (accessed February 12, 2007).
41 Ibid.
42 Memorandum of Conference With the President, August 28, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963, 1, www.state.gov, (accessed February 12,2007).
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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By the end of the first week after sending the 24 August cable, the administration decided
to not actively support a coup, but they did not actively discourage one either.
A cable sent on 29 August 1963 demonstrates the administration's indecision and
provides proof of Ameli can involvement in coup plotting. The State Depaliment told
Lodge that the administration had held high level meetings about the course of the war in
Vietnaln and decided to confinn the "basic course" set out in the 24 August cable. 46 The
cable then c1alified the administration's position. It authOlized General Harkins to
maintain contact with disgruntled generals and to continue to tell them that the U.S.
government still wanted the Nhus removed from power. 47 Harkins could "review plans"
but could not become involved in direct planning.48 The cable further stipulated that
Harkins should know the specifics of any attempts to remove the Nhus before giving final
approval to the generals. The government conditioned its suppOli further by pledging to
back a coup that "has a good chance of succeeding," but it would not pledge Amelican
troops. Only paragraph three mentioned Diem. It stated, "Question oflast approach to
Diem remains undecided and separate personal message from Secretary to you develops
our concerns and asks your cOlmnent. ,,49 To the administration, the cable stopped active
U.S. participation in the coup. They wanted the embassy and the CIA to act as advisors
to any indigenous effOlis to overthrow the government and to avoid pushing too hard.
The third paragraph is vague and confusing because the first two seem to say that the
United States would back an ovelihrow of Diem in order to get rid ofNhu as long as the

46 State-Saigon Cable 272, August 29, 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson Library: Lyndon B. Johnson
Papers: National Security File: Country File Vietnam Addendum, box 263 (temporary), folder: Hilsman,
Roger (Diem), The National Security Archive, The George Washington University,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (accessed February 12,2007).
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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ovelihrow was successful, whereas the third paragraph clarifies that the United States
was still undecided. The administration's indecision would continue for the next several
months.
Throughout the rest of September and October 1963, the administration's
hesitancy continued. On the one hand, Nolting continued to contend that Diem's
government was still prosecuting the war effectively and that no successor government
would be able to take over wel1. 50 On the other hand, Ambassador Lodge reacted to the
24 August cable by communicating with two South Vietnamese Generals through CIA
contacts. 5 ! The contacts told both of the men the U.S. position on Nhu and gave them
assurances that the United States would protect them if the coup failed or would support
the new government if it succeeded. 52 The embassy followed its orders and did not
involve itself in the intricacies ofthe planning. However, embassy officials stretched
their orders to the limits by encouraging the generals. At various points during
September and October, Lodge sent telegrams to the White House and the State
Department that detailed several military leaders who supported a coup and those who
might oppose one. The conversations in the committee meetings focused on how
successful a coup would be and how much pressure could be applied to Diem before he
snapped. During this entire period, indecision mounted.
The administration's ilTesolution continued into late October 1963. Even as late
as 29 October, just a few days before Diem fell, President Kennedy and his top advisors
still debated the pros and cons of a coup. In a meeting Attorney General Robeli Kelmedy

Hammer, 181-183.
Ibid., 180-18I.
52 Ibid., 189.
50

51
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and several of the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced concems about the wisdom of a COUp.53
Robert Kennedy pointed out that the intelligence reports were still as vague as they had
been at the beginning of the plotting and that the administration could not be celiain that
the coup would go off correctly. 54 In fact, he pointed out, they knew less about the
person who would take over the govemment than they did about Diem, and that if the
coup failed, Diem would certainly kick the United States out of Vietnam. Secretmy Rusk
wamed that backing offwould cause the plotters to become anti-American and could hUli
the war effOli. General Taylor cmne in on the side of the Attomey General. He said that
a completely successful coup would probably still hurt the war effort because the new
govemment would suffer from inexperience and would have to replace all ofthe civilian
leadership that was loyal to Diem, allowing the Viet Cong to make gains. 55 Director
John McCone agreed with this assessment. He thought that any outcome from a coup
would hurt the war. 56 Harriman then pointed out that if Diem remained in power, his
govemment would eventually lose support ofthe people, and the United States would
have to leave Vietnam anyway. He argued that a coup now, even ifit was a poor option,
was still the best altemative. 57 McGeorge Bundy pointed out that a civil war could erupt
in the countly and quickly spiral out of control. The president concluded that the United
States should actively discourage a weak coup attempt. In an October 29 th meeting he
confinned expressed his concem. The minutes read, "The President said it appem's that
the pro-and anti-Diem military forces are about equal. If this is so, any attempt to
53 Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 29, 1963, [this is the transcript for the
last meeting before the coup JFKL: JFKP: National Security File, Meetings & Memoranda series, box 317,
folder: Meetings on Vietnam, 10129/63, The National Security Archive, The George Washington
University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (accessed February 12,2007).
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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engineer a coup is silly."S8 In a 30 October cable to Ambassador Lodge the White House
drove home this point, "we believe that. .. you should take action to persuade coup
leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give
high prospect of success."S9 The administration won-ied that a coup failure would destroy
America's diplomatic and military credibility in Vietnam
Ambassador Lodge did not share the president's belief that the United States
could discourage a coup. He replied in an October 29th cable that the coup planning was
too far along and that it could COlmnence imminently. In a reply to this cable, McGoorge
Bundy told Lodge that the administration finnly believed that it had the power to prevent
a coup if it wanted to, and he told Lodge to discourage a coup ifhe thought that it did not
enjoy an extremely strong possibility of success. 60 FUlihennore, Bundy told Lodge that
in the event of a coup the United States would not intervene on either side. On the other
hand, he told Lodge that if a coup started, that "it is in the interest of the U.S. government
that it succeeds. 61 Telling Lodge to adopt the precautionary principle with future coup
plmming was as close as the administration got to telling him to discourage a coup.
Furthennore, Bundy only told him to oppose a coup ifhe thought that it would not
succeed. Since Lodge was extremely pro-coup, and the administration knew this, there
was little chance that he would call offthe coup. Although the administration did not
give its de facto approval of the coup that would happen in two days, its failure to
decisively discourage a coup acted as a de jure command.

Ibid.
Draft Cable, Eyes Only for Ambassador Lodge [CIA cable 79407, noted in upper right hand
comer], October 30, 1963, JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box 201, folder: Vietnam,
General: State & Defense Cables, 10129/63-10/31163 The National Security Archive, The George
Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (accessed February 12,2007).
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
58

59
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Indecision within the administration may have been mounting during this time,
but the Vietnamese generals did not perceive indecision, they perceived strong supp0l1.
Vietnam histOlian Ellen J. Hammer, in A Death in November, contends that the generals
supposed significant support from the United States. She claims:
Officially, the Amelican plot to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem was over by August
31 ... The Vietnamese generals, however, were neither politicians nor lawyers,
and for them the week of signals and contacts, the talk of pressures against the
govennnent and promises to the military could not be expunged by a piece of
paper as though all of it had never happened. Leading generals had been told that
the American government was at last ready to support them against the regime,
and they had joined in what had turned out to be, not a rehearsal, but soundings,
for the coup that was to come. 62
To a rational observer not plivy to the intense conflict within the administration, the
United States officially backed a coup. For a week, the top level ambassador and two
CIA contacts met in smoky backrooms and promised money and supp0l1 for an
ove11hrow of the Diem government. 63 During subsequent meetings in September and
October, neither Lodge nor the CIA officers ever told the generals that the United States
would no longer protect them. They did not tell them that the United States would not
recognize a successor government as legitimate. They did not tell them that they would
not supply them money to help them plan the coup. They did not tell them that they had
restored faith in the Diem government. Instead, they continued to monitor the coup
developments and carefully calculated the chances of success. 64 Historian Howard Jones,
argues that the Kennedy Administration ''bore heavy responsibility. The president has

Hammer, 196.
Ibid., 198-207.
64 Draft Cable, Eyes Only for Ambassador Lodge [CIA cable 79407, noted in upper right hand
comer], October 30, 1963, JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box 201, folder: Vietnam,
General: State & Defense Cables, 10/29/63-10/31/63 The National Security Archive, The George
Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/, (accessed February 12,2007).
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become an accomplice in the coup by signaling the conspirators that Diem would receive
no

u.s. assistance.,,65

When the coup occun-ed, American officials would proclaim that it had been an
indigenous affair, and while they had heard rumors, the United States had not been
involved.
A question then remains: was the United States con-ect in announcing that it had
had no part in the coup, or was the Kennedy administration somewhat responsible?
Lawrence Freedman argues that the administration "still avoided direct responsibility" by
being indecisive dUling the September through October period. 66 Freedman shifts biame
from the administration to Lodge, and he says that the administration was hesitant,
whereas Lodge was exceedingly pro-coup.67 Freedman suppOlis his claim by discussing
the 29 October 1963 meeting in which Robert Kennedy voiced support for Diem.
Freedman says that "[t]his reflected Washington's continued failure to grasp the dynamics
ofthe situation, desperately searching for a middle way that would bring a change of
policy without a change of govemment.,,68 Freedman concludes that Kennedy wanted to
discourage a coup, but that Lodge believed that the coup was too far along and avoided
stopping it. The conclusion that Kennedy's greatest contribution to the coup was his
inability to decide between suppOliing and discouraging an ovelihrow of Diem is wrong.
As evidenced above, the administration may have thought that it no longer backed a coup
after August, but the generals perceived that the United States still wanted it to continue.

65 Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations ofDiem and JFK Prolonged the
Vietnam War (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9-10.
66 Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 390.
67 Ibid., 393.
68 Ibid., 394.

Creating a Crisis 21
Within two years of the coup, administration officials forgot how their push for a
coup in August and their side line sitting through September and October contributed to
the generals' plan. In a brief written for President Johnson in 1966, William Bundy and
Bill Moyers argued that the United States only maintained contact with coup leaders and
that it did not "actively promote ... a COUp.,,69 They went on to say that the
administration decided that it could not prevent a coup, so they "stood aside" while the
Vietnamese generals undertook a purely local affair. 7o The conclusion that they reached
stands in stark contrast to the statements and conversations directly preceding and
following the coup. For instance, in a daily White House staff meeting on 4 November
1963, Fonestal and Bundy pointed out that cutting off financial aid to the regime and
verbally pressuring officials helped precipitate the COUp.7! FUlihermore, the 29 October
1963 cable discussed above provides direct evidence that the administration thought that
it could stop a coup as late as the beginning of November. Had the United States decided
to fully suppOli the Diem government during the months following the 24 August cable,
it seems that the coup would not have happened when and how it did.
On 1 November 1963 at 2:00 PM Saigon time the coup commenced. Rebel forces
seized control of several strategic areas within the city, and many military units joined the
coup forces. Diem barTicaded himself in the palace with his few remaining men, while

69 Department of State, Memorandum William P. Bundy-Bill Moyers, Discussions Conceming
the Diem Regime in August-October 1963, July 30, 1966, Lyndon B. Jolmson Library: Lyndon B. Jolmson
Papers, National Security File, Country File Vietnam, box 263, folder: Hilsman, Roger (Diem 1963), The
National Security Archive, The George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (accessed
February 12,2007).
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71 Memorandum for the Record of Discussion at the Daily White House Staff Meeting November
4, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963, 288, www.state.gov, (accessed
February 12,2007).
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the rebelling generals maneuvered to surround him.72 The White House received initial
reports that almost the entire anny in and surrounding Saigon had joined the coup forces
except for the palace guard. 73 None ofthe generals had cOlmnitted their forces to an all
out assault on the palace. Instead, they waited for Diem to give himselfup.74
Diem, realizing that his government was in imminent danger, phoned Ambassador
Lodge. He told the ambassador that some of his generals had rebelled. He wanted to
know if the United States backed the rebels, or ifit still backed him. Lodge lied. He told
Diem that he was not infOl1TIed enough about the situation to commit himself to any
official policy. Diem paused and then hung Up.75 Within hours, Diem escaped from the
palace into Saigon. He did not make if far before he and his brother were captured,
bound, and shot. 76
For the next few days following the coup, the United States received upbeat
reports ofthe success of the takeover and the popularity ofthe new regime. RepOlis
indicated that fewer than one hundred Vietnamese soldiers had lost their lives in the
attack and that no Americans had died. 77 Furthennore, the reaction of the Vietnamese
people to the coup surplised American officials. The Vietnamese held parades and threw
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roses on the rebel forces. 78 The coup seemed to have taken the Viet Cong by surprise
because even though the Viet Cong incident rate increased to about a thousand a week
immediately following the coup, the rate dropped back down to nonnalleve1s for the next
few weeks. 79
On November 3 1963, Ambassador Lodge sat down with the new civilian
leadership and talked about the specifics of the new government's policies and future
economic aid from the United States. The generals immediately expressed interest in the
resumption of American suppOli to help the government begin functioning again. 80
Lodge also asked them about the structure of the new government. They told Lodge that
they did not want to have a military dictatorship. Instead, they wanted to have a
government in which the military was barely involved, and they wanted the military to be
governed by a committee headed by General Tran Van Minh.8! The generals seemed
upbeat, and Lodge expressed a hope that they would be able to quickly consolidate the
government and begin to fight the communists effectively.
The administration's hope that the new government would organize quickly and
function efficiently rapidly dissipated. By the third, the headaches had already started.
Critics of the new government blamed the deaths of Diem and Nhu on the generals and

78 Memorandum for the Record of Discussion at the Daily White House Staff Meeting, FRUS,
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claimed that the govennnent was holding several political plisoners. 82 The
administration wanted to pressure the govennnent to become more democratic, but feared
that ifit pushed them too hard the new govennnent would collapse. 83 Analysts did not
believe that the new govennnent was losing the war against the communists. Even
though the generals were not actively losing the war, they also had not made any
advancement over the success of the Diem govennnent as evidenced by the lack of
improvement in the strategic hamlet program. 84 The State Depmiment optimistically
predicted that the government would quickly remedy the military situation because they
"stress[ ed a] desire to get on with war at full t1n·ottle.,,85 Even though the new
govennnent seemed to be getting off to a rough start, for the first couple of weeks, the
White House continued to believe that the generals would capitalize on the populality of
the coup, set up a new government, and fight the war more effectively.
The optimism that charactelized the first few weeks of the new regime was soon
tarnished by reports coming out of Vietnmn that the war was not going as well as the
Amelicans had thought it was. First, a repOli from the Bureau ofIntelligence and
Research stated that the morale ofthe South Vietnamese anny was suffering severely.
The report stated that as many as 80% of the South Vietnamese troops in one large unit
had deserted. 86 Second, repOlis stated that information the administration had received
in October that had concluded that the war were progressing was misleading because
82 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, Washington, November 3,
1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963, (accessed February 12, 2007).
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analysts had changed the rules for detennining troop strengths and enemy activities.
Third, the Viet Cong escalated its attacks to a level that had not been seen for six months
and had captured many weapons and other material. 87 The new govemment had failed to
bring the situation under control within the first few weeks of being in power.
Not only did the administration find out that the war was not going well, the new
South Vietnamese prime minister, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, informed them that the strategic
hamlet program had collapsed in the Delta region. 88 He said that the Viet Cong had been
making huge advancements in the Delta for several years since the population of the
Delta had lost faith in the Diem govemment, the United States, and the successor
govemment. Tho explained that in two years more than 20,000 Viet Cong casualties had
been reported in the Delta region. Surprisingly, this number was larger than the total
number of Viet Cong estimated to have been in the region two years ago. 89 These
statistics suggested that the Viet Cong could quickly replace their losses with more
people from the countryside. Tho used An Giang, his home province, as an example of a
failing. He said that the Diem govemment had forced the population to build the
strategic hamlets, canals, roads and bridges. The Vietnamese govenm1ent did not
adequately compensate the peasants for their work, so on average they lost 1,000 piastres
apiece while they worked for the govemment. In contrast to this, the Viet Cong only
required at most 100 piastres for taxes. 90 Tho expressed a desire to remedy the problems
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associated with the strategic hamlet program, but fixing these problems would first
require a functioning government in Saigon.
The new government in Saigon never recovered from the coup against Diem.
Even though the generals had expressed a willingness to fix the problems that the Diem
regime created, they encountered serious roadblocks. 91 The government did not have a
clear program of action designed to win the war; their government seemed to be
drifting.

92

Additionally, the generals were becoming suspicious of one another. When

one increased his power over an area or a division ofthe government, the other ones tried
to counter his efforts. Americans began to fear that rivalries among the generals could
cause a breakdown in the government. 93 The further deterioration of the hamlet program
provides more evidence that the new government was failing. In a memo to President
Johnson, Michael F onestal said that" [0 ]ne recent repOli states that out of 219 strategic
hamlets in the Long An Province which had been reported as completed under the Diem
regime, only 45 actually have been identified. ,,94 By the middle of December, the
political and military situation teetered like a house of cards.

In addition to an unstable political and military environment, South Vietnam
stood on the brink of economic meltdown. The South Vietnamese budget predictions
looked dismal. The projected deficit was 7 billion piasters. The deficit represented 8%

91 Memorandum From the Chairman of the Central Intelligence Agency's Working Group on
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of Vietnam's GNP, and one third of the money supply that existed in Vietnam. 95 Since
Vietnam's economy was based heavily on agriculture, it could not expand rapidly enough
to satisfy the growing international demand. Economists feared that if the budget was not
stabilized that inflation would begin. 96 Given the political instability that existed, rapidly
increasing food prices could have caused the majority ofthe peasants to starve and
rebel. 97 At the very least, increasing food prices would cause enough political instability
to completely preclude the new government from consolidating power.98 McNamara
cOlmnented that "the new government is sitting on top of a keg of political dynamite."
He argued that the solution to the problem should be to increase the amount of fertilizer
being channeled into agricultural regions because this would vastly increase the
productive yields. 99 Officials realized the seriousness ofthe situation and pledged to
keep the economy and therefore the government fl.-om collapsing, thereby deepening the
American commitment. IOO
The Diem coup directly impaired the new government's ability to fight
effectively. The generals failed to create a successful government, and they failed to
motivate the people politically or militmily. The United States had recognized this as a
possible outcome before the coup, and Robert Kennedy identified these problems as
likely results of a rebellion, but the plotting continued. Not only was the war going
badly, by the middle of December, it had probably deteriorated further than it would have
under Diem in the same amount of time. Even if the pro-coup policymakers had been
95 Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam, Honolulu, November 20, 1963,
FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume N, Vietnam, August-December 1963, www.state.gov, (accessed February 12,
2007.)
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right and Diem's government would have eventually failed, there was a chance that it
would have corrected itself, or that the United States could have prevented coup forces
from taking over; thereby, keeping the conflict at a simmer until the domestic and
international political enviromnent favored a settlement or a withdrawal. Instead, the
United States decided to deepen its military commitment from 16,500 soldiers and
advisors in 1963 to hundreds of thousands of combat troops within a few years and its
economic commitment in a like manner. The rapid escalation that would come months
later bloomed from roots laid in November.
By January 1964 the political, economic, and military problems created by the
coup had worsened. Reports began to come out of Vietnam that the South Vietnamese
govermnent could be sliding toward neutralization. lOI On January 28, Major General
Nguyen Khanh, a senior military officer in the South Vietnamese Anny told an American
advisor that some of the generals wanted to negotiate a neutralization agreement with
North Vietnam. He said that these pro-neutralization forces were planning a coup on 31
J anumy, and that once they took power they would "immediately call for neutralization
of" South Vietnam. I02 Khanh used the rumors of a pro-neutralization coup as a pretext
for leading a conservative coup on 29 January to preempt the liberal forces. I03 In all
likelihood, Khanh manufactured the seriousness ofthe neutralization rumors to justify his
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own power grab. 104 Regardless of his motivation, he took power, and his government
proved as short lived and ineffective as the previous.
In conclusion, the United States shares responsibility for the brevity of the postDiem government and the economic, military, and political nosedive that occuned in
Vietnam in December and January 1963. The White House finnly believed that a
communist takeover of Vietnam would cause unacceptable domestic and international
political fallout. Operating from the premise that the United States could not fail in
Vietnam, they never seriously considered withdrawing when the political situation went
south. Instead, the public reaction to the Buddhist crisis in May caused the United States
to become acutely aware of Diem and Nhu's unpopularity with the people. Fearing that
an unpopular government could not continue to fight the war effectively, the
administration oveneacted and sent the 24 August cable. Throughout the rest of the fall
an internal debate occuned within the administration over the pros and cons of a coup.
The White House never decided to preempt a coup attempt. As a result, they played a
central role in the ovelihrow of Diem. Vietnamese generals believed that the United
States wanted them to overthrow Diem and that they would receive the full support from
the White House. The results ofthe coup were not what the administration expected.
The generals, concerned more about their own power, never set up an organized
government. Furthennore, morale and economic problems plagued the country. Finally,
the system broke down and one power hungry general after another took over. One
cannot decisively conclude that had Diem not been ovelihrown that he would have done a
better job. However, it is clear that his demise and the failure of the administration to
104 Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to
the Secretary ofState/1/ Washington, January 30, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964,23,
www.state.gov, (accessed February 12,2007).
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plan for a successor government led to a much quicker collapse of the South Vietnamese
war effOli and the accelerated involvement of the United States.
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